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A Critical Review of South Africa’s 
Carbon Tax Policy Paper:  
Recommendations for the 
Implementation of an Offset 
Mechanism 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The South African government has emphasised the need for ‘developing 
country’ solutions to climate change that simultaneously pursue GHG 
reductions and socioeconomic development. To encourage the transition to a 
low-carbon economy the National Treasury has proposed a carbon tax and 
offset mechanism to be introduced in 2015. The practical delivery of the offset 
scheme remains uncertain. This paper investigates which features and 
governance structure would be desirable for such a mechanism in South Africa. 
Primary research is conducted into the South African voluntary carbon registry; 
Credible Carbon. The questions asked by this paper are: Should firms be 
allowed to offset emissions? What is the ideal way to implement offsets in South 
Africa? This paper concludes that Credible Carbon provides a good model for 
carbon trading that can be scaled up to meet demand under the new regulations. 
However, government needs to ensure that projects continue to deliver 
acceptable social benefits and that carbon auditors are well-trained and 
accountable.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Carbon Tax Policy Paper released by the National Treasury in May 2013 
outlines a set of new rules for pollution control in South Africa to be introduced 
from 1 January 2015. The Policy Paper proposes a carbon tax of R120 per ton of 
carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) to be levied on emissions in excess of the 
designated tax-free thresholds. Overtime the tax rate will gradually be increased 
and tax-free thresholds lowered. The Policy Paper notes that, “a carbon tax can 
be complemented or replaced by an Emissions Trading Scheme at a later stage” 
(National Treasury, 2013: 9). In the meantime, the policy outlines an offset 
mechanism which will allow firms to lower their tax liability by purchasing 
carbon credits to offset 5-10% of their total emissions.  
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South Africa’s new rules follow a global trend of using market-based 
instruments such as carbon taxes and carbon trading to mitigate dangerous 
climate change. Carbon trading takes two main forms, ‘offsetting’ and ‘cap-and-
trade’, with the straightforward goal of allowing companies and governments to 
reduce their emissions cheaply. Carbon offsetting entails the purchase of carbon 
reductions or credits. Firms and governments may purchase offsets because of a 
legal requirement to do so, or may voluntarily wish to reduce their carbon 
footprint. In South Africa, carbon trading currently operates as a voluntary 
market where firms purchase carbon offsets primarily for public relations or 
corporate social responsibility reasons. The market is small but growing, 
covering less than 0.1% of South Africa’s total emissions in 2011 (Peters-
Stanley & Hamilton, 2012).  
 
The South African government’s perspective on climate change is to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions while recognising that the priority for a 
developing country is to address poverty and socioeconomic development 
(National Treasury, 2013). The offset mechanism aims to provide firms with 
greater flexibility in meeting their targets, while broader benefits of sustainable 
development and poverty alleviation are visualised. It is argued that offsetting 
will increase investment into least cost mitigation options by incentivising firms 
to buy carbon offsets from projects that deliver emission reductions at a R/CO2e 
cost lower than the carbon tax. Moreover local offset projects have the potential 
to deliver social benefits to communities such as rural development and 
employment (National Treasury, 2013). 
 
The aim of this paper of is twofold; firstly to provide a critical analysis of the 
Treasury’s decision to establish an offset mechanism, and secondly to suggest an 
appropriate delivery vehicle for the offset mechanism. This paper is structured 
as a series of questions and recommendations. The first question asks whether or 
not the purchase of carbon offsets should be allowed. In answering this question 
the economic argument for carbon trading is put forward, tempered by real 
world concerns and international experience. The establishment of an offset 
mechanism is motivated by efficiency gains and increased flexibility for firms. 
The following questions then relate to how the offset mechanism should be 
implemented. It is recommended that the mechanism is delivered by 
independent carbon registries that act as stock exchanges and already have the 
technical know-how and systems of governance and oversight in place. A case 
study analysis is conducted to assess a potential model for carbon trading.  
 
The case study is the South African voluntary carbon registry Credible Carbon 
and a selection of projects that sell offsets through Credible Carbon. Information 
is obtained from an interview with Anton Cartwright (founding member of 
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Credible Carbon and carbon market expert) on 22 July 2013, visiting the project 
site of the Hout Bay Recycling Co-op, and project verification reports. The 
advantage of such a case study is that it provides unique and detailed insight into 
the ‘real’ workings of carbon trading. This paper argues that the National 
Treasury should recognise local registries such as Credible Carbon which focus 
on offset projects with social benefits as appropriate delivery vehicles for the 
proposed offset mechanism. However, external systems of oversight may be 
required to ensure that projects continue to deliver adequate social benefits and 
that carbon auditors are capable and objective. 
 
 
2. Should firms be allowed to offset emissions?  
 
 
a. Theory of carbon trading  
 
Carbon trading is grounded in the economic theory of pollution control which 
seeks to find the most efficient way to reduce emissions. In an economy, if the 
cost of pollution to the polluter is lower than the cost of pollution to society as a 
whole, and carbon cannot be traded, there is a negative externality in that more 
pollution is produced than is socially optimal (Sloman, 2006). The theory 
assumes that we know the marginal benefit and marginal cost of pollution to 
society and thus could theoretically calculate the level of emissions that 
maximises the welfare of society. In a cap-and-trade system a ‘cap’ or limit is 
set on carbon emissions at this quantity. This cap is represented in Figure 1 as a 
vertical line at the optimal level e*. With a cap system the firm is commanded to 
reduce its emissions to the point e*. With a carbon tax, e* is achieved by 
attaching a fixed price to pollution indicated by the horizontal line. The optimal 
level of abatement e* is achieved because the firm will not abate more if the 
marginal cost of abatement exceeds the tax rate. The tax revenue is illustrated by 
the shaded area.  
 
In an economy with multiple firms, firms can trade carbon within the cap-and-
trade system. The overarching cap is set by the government at the socially 
efficient level creating the scarcity required for a market. Participants within the 
cap-and-trade system then buy or receive the right to pollute in the form of 
permits or allowances based on the emissions reduction target. These permits 
can then be traded among participants with different marginal abatement costs in 
order to achieve the target at the least economic cost (Stern, 2007). The theory 
assumes a perfectly competitive market system in which firms take prices as 
given and there are no impediments to the free trade of permits. 
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Figure 1: Carbon Tax vs. Cap-and-Trade 
  
Whereas permits confer the right to emit, carbon credits can be purchased by 
firms to ‘offset’ emitting activity. Exchanging carbon offsets requires creating a 
tradable commodity. This is achieved through individual projects which reduce 
GHG emissions through various means. To be credible, these reductions must be 
verifiable, measurable and additional to a business-as-usual scenario. The 
economic cost of reducing carbon can be lowered if offset projects face lower 
abatement costs than firms. Moreover if one ton of carbon has the same global 
warming potential regardless of where it is emitted, firms should be allowed to 
buy carbon credits from offset producers located anywhere in the world. As 
stated in the Stern Review, “as long as these credits represent real emissions 
reductions, there is little reason to restrict their use, as cost-efficiency demands 
that emissions reductions are made wherever it is cheapest” (Stern, 2007).  
 
According to economic theory, carbon trading and a carbon tax will yield the 
same environmental results and carbon prices in the long run. The difference is 
that a carbon tax provides price certainty over the short to medium term while 
giving no absolute limit on emissions. Whereas an emissions trading scheme 
provides certainty with regards to level of emissions, but not the price (Stern, 
2007). The Carbon Tax Policy Paper combines the two instruments by setting a 
stable price for emissions and allowing firms to offset 5-10% of emissions based 
on their mitigation potential.  
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b. Limitations and market failure  
 
The real world is more complex and many of the simplifying assumptions 
mentioned in the above section do not hold. As a consequence carbon trading 
functions less smoothly in reality. In the offset market, trading in an invisible 
compound creates a problem of asymmetric information between buyers and 
sellers, and high transaction costs such as verifying and monitoring offset 
projects are required to convince buyers that reductions are credible. The theory 
assumes a market structure where individual firms have no market power. 
However in reality actors are unequal and power is concentrated amongst large 
firms and multi-nationals, e.g. the energy sector (Spash, 2010). Powerful vested 
interest groups also wield influence over the institutional structure of the system 
and the way in which permits are allocated (Spash, 2010). Overall market 
distortions mean that the equilibrium price and quantity of carbon is unlikely to 
represent a true optimum. However, so long as the costs of market failure do not 
outweigh the benefits of achieving emissions reductions at a lower cost a case 
can be made in favour of cap-and-trade schemes.  
 
The decision to implement a carbon tax instead of a cap-and-trade system in 
South Africa was greatly influenced by real world considerations. The 
oligopolistic market structure of the energy sector would have hampered 
efficient carbon trading. Further, government regulation of electricity prices and 
ownership of Eskom would need to be carefully factored into the design of an 
emissions trading scheme (Goldblatt, 2010). The costs of setting up a cap-and-
trade system were estimated to be far higher than implementing a tax. Carbon 
trading is administratively complex and there is a need for a transparent and 
effective institutional framework which would be difficult and costly to establish 
in South Africa (National Treasury, 2013). The carbon tax will also provide 
government with a secure revenue stream which can be used to address the 
distributional impacts of carbon pricing (Goldblatt, 2010). 
 
With both carbon taxes and cap-and-trade schemes there is the upfront difficulty 
of determining the appropriate price or emissions cap. A lack of data, complex 
feedback mechanisms and difficulties in quantifying the full benefits of 
reductions pose substantial challenges to calculating the socially optimal level of 
emissions (Spash, 2010). The Carbon Tax Policy document states that a tax of 
R120 per tCO2e is a modest price that balances the need to transition away from 
carbon against the burden of higher carbon prices on households and 
commercial competitiveness.  
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c. International experience with carbon trading  
 
Carbon offset markets exist under both voluntary and compliance schemes. In 
compliance markets demand for offsets is created by a mandatory legal 
requirement. At the end of 2012 the main compliance markets were the EU’s 
Emission Trading System; the Clean Development Mechanism; the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (north-eastern American states) and New Zealand’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme (Newell et al., 2013). The EU’s Emission Trading 
System is the world largest cap-and-trade scheme; it is company-based and 
covers roughly 40% of Europe’s emissions. The Clean Development Mechanism 
is an offset market set up by the UN’s Kyoto Protocol. The Clean Development 
Mechanism aims to help industrialized countries meet their Kyoto abatement 
targets by financing carbon reduction projects in developing countries. 
Voluntary markets enable companies and individuals to reduce their carbon 
footprint on a voluntary basis. The voluntary market is fragmented into 
numerous registries which market and sell credits. Examples of large standards 
bodies for voluntary carbon offsets are the Gold Standard and the Verified 
Carbon Standard. Collectively, carbon transaction volumes reached 10.3 billion 
tons of CO2e in 2011, accounting for roughly 20% of global emissions (Kossoy 
& Guigon, 2012).  
 
While the volumes of carbon traded have been growing, both within markets 
and due to the creation of new markets, prices have been extremely volatile as 
indicated by Figure 2. The major collapse in prices in 2007 represents Europe’s 
largest carbon trading hurdle so far. The price drop arose due to a number of 
factors. In the pilot phase modest emissions reduction goals were set under time 
pressure and without reliable data. When data on aggregate emission levels was 
released in 2006 participants realised that the supply of permits exceeded 
demand and the rules of the system prevented participants from ‘banking’ these 
permits for future use. This over-allocation of allowances lead to a carbon price 
that was essentially zero (Newell et al., 2013).  
 
In all markets prices have been falling in response to the global economic 
downturn. In the European market, current low prices have been caused by an 
oversupply of credits due to an unprecedented amount of carbon offset projects 
and lack of demand due to insufficient reduction commitments from developed 
countries. This has been compounded by the global recession which has reduced 
demand for carbon credits via reduced emission levels (Seppänen et al., 2013). 
Price volatility in the carbon market is harmful as it creates uncertainty and 
deters firms from making long-term investments in low-carbon technologies. A 
volatile carbon price also makes it difficult to determine whether or not 
individual carbon offset projects will be successful. Price floors and ceilings 
have been suggested to reduce the risk of price spikes. However these 
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mechanisms need to be credible to work, and price intervention runs the risk of 
creating unintended wealth transfers and compromising market clearing (Stern, 
2007).   
 
 
 
(Source: Newell et al., 2013: 127) 
 
Figure 2: CO2 Allowance Prices (nominal)  
 
 
The EU’s Emission Trading System has been successful in that it has 
significantly reduced emissions while not hindering the competitiveness of EU 
firms (Laing et al., 2013). Emissions savings attributable to the EU’s Emissions 
Trading System are estimated to be in the range of 40 to 80 MtCO2 per year 
which is bigger than the impact of most other individual energy-environmental 
policy instruments (Laing et al., 2013). However, the scheme has been criticised 
for failing to encourage firms to initiate long-term investment in new, clean 
technology. Instead reductions have come from short-term fuel-switching and 
energy conservation, as well as purchasing carbon credits (Leiter et al., 2011).  
 
The world’s largest offsetting scheme - the Clean Development Mechanism - 
has received both praise and criticism. It has been touted as a means to achieve 
higher overall reductions without compromising equity concerns as it entails 
developed countries financing the transition to low-carbon economies in the 
developing world through the purchase of offsets (Gilbertson & Reyes, 2009). 
Developing countries are arguably able to create carbon credits at a lower cost as 
they have on average lower energy efficiencies, less advanced technologies, 
lower labour costs and weaker regulatory requirements (Kollmuss et al., 2008). 
8 
 
To ensure that host countries benefit from offset projects the Mechanism 
requires projects to deliver sustainable development benefits in addition to 
carbon reductions. Past research indicates that while offsets do bring revenue 
into developing countries, broader development benefits to communities have 
been limited (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012). Moreover, offsets have 
primarily been purchased from India and China, who are the biggest emitters in 
the developing world. To address inequality concerns, as of 2013 only carbon 
credits from existing projects registered before 2013 or from LDCs will be 
accepted.  
 
 
d. Recommendation: Offsets are needed to facilitate 
adjustment  
 
The government’s decision to implement a carbon tax instead of a full cap-and-
trade system is the right choice given the high costs of setting up and enforcing a 
cap-and-trade scheme in South Africa. While a carbon tax will not guarantee 
that environmental targets are reached, it will provide the price stability needed 
to encourage firms to make long-term investment decisions and commit 
resources to research and innovation in emissions reduction. However, a carbon 
tax alone will not provide firms with much flexibility to abate emissions. In 
particular, energy-intensive industries are concerned about their ability to reduce 
emissions given that they have little control over the carbon intensity of 
electricity (Copeland, 2012). The establishment of an offset mechanism 
alongside the carbon tax is recommended to increase flexibility and lessen the 
impact of the tax on commercial competitiveness. Increased flexibility will also 
give businesses more reason to stay in South Africa and not relocate to areas that 
do not have carbon policies in place – a phenomenon known as carbon leakage. 
Moreover, a reliable offset mechanism will increase the economic efficiency 
with which emissions reductions are achieved if offset projects can reduce 
carbon at R/CO2 cost lower than R120. The price of R120 provides an upper 
limit for the price of carbon offsets. This will reduce instability in the market 
that has been problematic in international trading schemes. 
 
The question then becomes: what percentage of emissions should firms be 
allowed to offset? Economic theory suggests that allowing firms to offset 100% 
of their total taxable emissions allows for carbon abatement at the least cost if 
credits are priced below R120. The concern is that by allowing firms to simply 
offset, firms do not have an incentive to make long term changes and move 
away from fossil fuels. The validity of this claim depends on how long term the 
offset projects are. For example, offset projects that invest in renewable energies 
will contribute to a shift away from fossil fuels. The offset allowance should 
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then depend both on the firm’s ability to abate and the nature of offset projects. 
Given the efficiency gains to be had from carbon trading, an offset allowance of 
between 5 and 10% appears modest, although the type and credibility of offset 
projects must be considered.  
 
 
3. What is the ideal way to implement offsets in 
South Africa?  
 
 
a. The ideal governance structure for carbon     
taxation / exchange 
 
Government can elect to manage the sale of offsets itself by establishing a 
public carbon registry or it can allow companies to buy offsets from existing 
registries which currently operate without government oversight. The 
government is currently involved with carbon trading via the Clean 
Development Mechanism. South African offset projects seeking to register with 
the Clean Development Mechanism are overseen by the Department of Energy 
which has some capacity to aid the approval process (DoE, 2013). Offset 
projects are verified by accredited carbon auditors, the majority of which are 
international (DoE, 2013). Establishing a centralised, government controlled 
registry would require significant institutional capacity, political will and 
technical expertise. It is precisely a lack of these characteristics that has been 
held liable for the low uptake in offset projects in sub-Saharan Africa (Olsen & 
Fenhann, 2008).  
 
Arguably, a better alternative would be for government to decentralise the sale 
of offsets by permitting firms to purchase carbon credits from independent and 
effective registries that already possess the technical knowhow and have systems 
of oversight and governance in place. The question then is whether to recognise 
well-established, international registries and/or smaller locally established 
registries such as Credible Carbon which is currently the only locally developed 
carbon registry in South Africa. Whereas international registries sell offsets that 
have been produced all over the world, Credible Carbon focuses on offset 
projects operating in South Africa which have high social benefits in addition to 
GHG reductions (Cartwright, 2013). The following section describes Credible 
Carbon’s model of carbon trading, and thereafter questions its desirability and 
scalability.  
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b. The Credible Carbon model  
 
Credible Carbon, established in 2008, is South Africa’s only locally developed 
voluntary carbon registry. As a carbon registry it acts as a stock exchange 
allowing buyers and sellers to transact Verified Emissions Reductions (VERs). 
VER is the term given to a legitimate offset in the voluntary market that is 
equivalent in global warming potential to 1 ton of CO2. Offsets are issued and 
can be sold only after they have been verified by an independent carbon auditor. 
Verification is required to attach value to the invisible compound and convince 
buyers that the GHG reductions are real and that carbon credits deliver their 
stated benefits to communities. In order to assure buyers that offsets are 
legitimate registries adopt a set of rigorous carbon standards. The standards of 
the Clean Development Mechanism which are notorious for their complexity, 
and high levels of detail and technical expertise, are required to quantify a 
project’s GHG reductions. These stringent standards have resulted in high 
transaction costs that are debilitating for smaller projects (Chadwick, 2006). The 
standards adopted by Credible Carbon are less onerous in order to cut down on 
transaction costs and enable smaller projects to be successful. Credible Carbon’s 
standards are simple and easy to understand so as to gain buyers’ trust in the 
market and system (Cartwright, 2013). 
 
Four questions guide Credible Carbon’s verification process: 
 
1. Is the project real?  
2. Is the described technology in place and functioning in accordance with 
its design specification? 
3. Are the estimates of greenhouse gas emissions reduction reasonable in 
terms of accepted international standards and unbiased towards buyer or 
seller? 
4. Is there a discernible impact on poverty? 
 
Credible Carbon’s competitors are larger, internationally established voluntary 
registries such as Gold Standard and the Verified Carbon Standard. These bodies 
typically have more rigorous carbon standards and are suitable for large scale 
projects that produce enough carbon credits to afford the higher transaction 
costs. However large scale projects typically tend to have less social 
development benefits (Corbera et al., 2009). As voluntary buyers in the South 
African market tend to be interested in the social benefits of projects as well as 
the GHG reductions there was a gap in the market for a registry that was more 
affordable for smaller carbon projects with high social benefits (Cartwright, 22 
June 2013: personal communication). Credible Carbon has also attracted larger 
offset projects. For example, Reliance Compost opted to move from the 
international registry TUV Nord to Credible Carbon due to exorbitant money 
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and time costs associated with TUV Nord’s carbon standards. In terms of the 
price of carbon, Credible Carbon is competitive with international registries. 
Credible Carbon’s prices in 2012 ranged from R43 per tCO2 to R250 per tCO2 
depending on the size of the transaction and nature of the project. In 
comparison, the weighted average price in the global voluntary market was 
US$5.9 per tCO2 (R59) (Peters-Stanley & Yin, 2013).  
 
As indicated by the fourth guiding question, projects registered with Credible 
Carbon should have a discernible impact on poverty. Credible Carbon aims to 
direct revenue towards projects that have social benefits on the grounds that 
mitigating climate change involves both poverty reduction and GHG reduction. 
Carbon trading is seen as the technical vehicle to provide social progress 
(Cartwright, 22 June 2013: personal communication). Credible Carbon does not 
operate for profit and requires that 70% of the carbon revenue after audit fees 
must be returned to the project community. Credible Carbon has experienced 
growth in volumes traded from 8 000 tCO2 in 2010 to over 42 000 tCO2 in 2012 
(Cartwright, 2013).  
 
Credible Carbon currently has 10 projects from which buyers can purchase 
offsets. Three projects of different scale and type are referred to and investigated 
in this paper. The projects are:  
 
 Reliance Compost – avoids methane production by composting green 
waste from the Cape Town metropolitan municipality. Size: 145 919 tCO2 
per annum  
 Umdoni Bio Fuel – provides 4000 households in Umdoni Kwazulu-Natal 
with bioethanol gel (a by-product of the local sugarcane industry) to 
replace coal, wood, paraffin and dung fuel sources. Size: 800 tCO2 per 
annum  
 The Hout Bay Recycling Co-op – a small project in Imizamo Yethu 
township in Hout Bay that sorts and recycles waste to reduce the amount 
of waste entering landfills and minimize production of virgin materials. 
Size: 296 tCO2 per annum  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the stakeholders in the carbon business and how they interact 
with one another. PACE stands for The Promoting Access to Carbon Equity 
Centre. PACE is a South African based, not-for-profit organisation that plays the 
role of project advisor and coordinator, or ‘project proponent’, on behalf of 
Credible Carbon. PACE was established before Credible Carbon in 2004 to help 
South African projects seeking to register with the Clean Development 
Mechanism. PACE then led to the development of Credible Carbon, a separate 
legal entity, as a means to address the shortfalls of the Clean Development 
Mechanism. The following aims to describe the roles, responsibilities and 
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incentives of each stakeholder in greater detail, as well as the nature of 
negotiations and oversight between the parties.  
 
(Source: Author, based on communications with Cartwright on 22 June, 2013) 
 
Figure 3: Stakeholders and Transaction Flows  
 
 
Project developer and community  
 
The project developer initiates the offset project and assumes responsibility for 
the day-to-day managing of the project. The project developer may be an 
individual, community, NGO, firm or municipality. Reliance Compost is a for-
profit company. The Hout Bay Recycling Co-op is a social enterprise that was 
started by the residents of Imizamo Yethu township and the NGO Thrive. The 
project initially required additional funding from Thrive but has since become 
independent of the NGO. Umdoni Bio Fuel started out as a means for the 
Umdoni Municipality to meet its Free Basic Alternative Energy obligations, and 
later established itself as an offset project. The community refers to the broader 
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beneficiaries of the project such as the project employees and surrounding 
inhabitants.  
 
It is important for the project developer and the registry to clearly define who 
has ownership of the carbon. This is clarified in the Credit Supply Agreement 
before the project is registered. For example, if a project entails fitting RDP 
houses with solar water heaters, it must be clear whether or not it is the 
government, who paid for the heaters, or the private households, that now use 
the heaters, that will receive revenue from VER sales. The project developer has 
an incentive to maximise his revenue from carbon. This entails choosing a 
registry that will negotiate a high carbon price and deliver high net cash returns 
quickly, and maximising the project’s stated carbon reductions. The role of the 
carbon auditor is thus crucial to ensure that projects accurately report volumes of 
carbon abated. Projects are required to keep careful records in order to ensure 
that their abatement can be correctly recognised. 
 
 
Project proponent 
 
The Promoting Access to Carbon Equity (PACE) Centre is the project 
proponent. PACE plays the role of project advisor and coordinates interactions 
between Credible Carbon, the project and the auditors. PACE is responsible for 
conducting the initial due diligence on potential projects and thus assumes the 
upfront time risks. PACE advises projects on how best to proceed, also helping 
to create the initial documents required to register the project. The carbon 
auditors are hired and paid by Credible Carbon but managed and overseen by 
PACE. PACE ensures that the carbon auditors stay within budget, and 
recommends deadlines for verification reports to prevent auditors from getting 
too caught up in the finer details. PACE does not operate for profit and receives 
R2 for each ton of CO2 sold from Credible Carbon.   
 
 
Carbon auditors  
 
Independent carbon auditors are hired by Credible Carbon to produce yearly 
verification reports. Audits typically last four days and involve a site visit and 
beneficiary interviews. The auditor answers the four questions that guide the 
registry’s standards and quantifies the project’s annual emissions reductions. 
The auditor is required to confirm that estimates of emissions reductions are 
“plausible and unbiased”. By requiring a good estimate rather than a precise 
number Credible Carbon is able to keep the cost of auditing down. Auditing is 
the largest transaction cost and Credible Carbon typically pays R35 000 for 
audits per project per year which is substantially less than other registries. Past 
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auditors used by Credible Carbon include the University of Cape Town’s 
Energy Research Centre, SouthSouthNorth, Urban Earth, Carbon Calculated and 
The Green House, all of which are South African.  
 
Verification is critical for the credibility of the registry and project which is 
required to attract buyers and higher prices. The registry must choose auditors 
that will be acceptable to the project developer and potential buyers. This 
requires auditors that are expert, efficient and do not have any conflict of 
interests. Ideally, auditors should value their reputation more than the fee they 
receive (Atkins, 2013). The verification report for Reliance Carbon found the 
project’s estimates to be reasonable and slightly understated. For 2012 the 
auditors estimated reductions of 145 919 tons of CO2e, and Reliance Compost 
estimated 142 376 tons of CO2e (Hetherington & Palmer, 2013). The original 
PIN and 2011 verification report for Umdoni Bio Fuel estimated carbon 
reductions of roughly 5 535 tCO2e. This estimate was based on the assumption 
that the bioethanol gel fuel dispensed to the households each month lasted for 
the full month, when in reality the fuel was used up within 7 days. Thereafter 
households reverted to paraffin, firewood or electricity. This error was only 
picked up in the third and most recent verification report and estimates were 
revised downwards by 85% to 800 tCO2 per annum (Mckenzie & Botes, 2012). 
While the auditor’s word is final, a misleading verification report that 
exaggerates carbon reductions can be harmful to the registry’s reputation. This 
should incentivise the registry to ensure that reports are accurate and unbiased.  
 
 
Registry 
 
Credible Carbon acts at the market place putting sellers into contact with buyers. 
Credible Carbon markets its credits through its website, at conferences and by 
presenting to businesses interested in reducing their carbon footprint. Credible 
Carbon sells the Verified Emissions Reductions to buyers and receives payment. 
The revenue is first used to pay off the auditing fee of R35 000, thereafter 
Credible Carbon pays PACE R2 per ton of CO2e sold and collects a registration 
fee of R1 per ton. The remaining sales revenue is given to the project. The 
Voluntary Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement is the legal document that 
transfers ownership of VERs from the project to the buyer. Ownership of credits 
is transferred from the project to the buyer at the point of sale. Thereafter, the 
buyer and not the project can claim to have reduced emissions. The registry is 
responsible for negotiating a good price and guaranteeing that the VERs 
conform to the registry’s standards. The price of offsets is influenced by various 
factors which are discussed in the following section on price determination. 
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Buyers 
 
Corporate buyers account for the majority of transactions in the global voluntary 
market – 92% in 2011. The largest share of these buyers (54%) purchased 
offsets for corporate social responsibility, public relations and branding reasons. 
Other motivations include resale of offsets (22%) and anticipation of formal 
regulation (12%) (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012). Credible Carbon’s largest 
buyers are financial services firms, fuel companies, conferences, tourism 
services and politicians who purchase offsets to boost their green image or 
achieve corporate sustainability goals (Cartwright, 22 June 2013: personal 
communication). Increasingly, South African firms may also feel pressure from 
EU-based firms that want information on the carbon footprint of exports (Peters-
Stanley & Hamilton, 2012). Buying carbon credits from Credible Carbon is 
straightforward and accessible to anyone through their online purchasing 
system. Buyers can state how much carbon they would like to buy and from 
which projects. Buyers can then hold their offsets and later resell them, or retire 
them. If credits are retired they are removed from the system to prevent them 
from being used more than once. The movement of the VERs is tracked by the 
registry.  
 
Information asymmetry between buyers and sellers is an inevitable challenge in 
a market that involves an intangible compound. The project developer has in-
depth knowledge into the GHG reductions and social benefits of their project. In 
order for the credits to be legitimate and command a high price, it is important 
that this information is communicated to buyers who are typically cautious of 
projects they don’t understand. In order to reduce information asymmetry 
Credible Carbon aims to make the entire process as transparent as possible. 
Project summaries, Project Idea Notes and verification reports are publically 
available on the website. The registry is easy to contact and buyers are 
encouraged to visit the project sites in order to close the information gap 
(Cartwright, 22 June 2013: personal communication)  
 
 
c. The social outcomes delivered by Credible Carbon  
 
Credible Carbon requires that projects have a discernible impact on poverty, but 
places no requirements on how carbon revenue is spent by a project. In the 
verification report, the auditors list and qualitatively assess the social benefits of 
a project. The Hout Bay Recycling Co-op benefits the community by providing 
an income opportunity in an impoverished area and by offering a waste removal 
service to the surrounding township which is not serviced by the municipality. 
The project keeps its carbon revenue in a staff trust and spending decisions are 
made collectively by the employees (Mason-Jones, 2013). The social outcomes 
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of the Umdoni Bio Fuel project include cost savings of around R50 – R70 per 
household per month as the gel fuel replaces some of the need to buy paraffin. 
This cost saving is significant relative to the prevailing levels of poverty in the 
Umdoni community. The gel stoves also reduce the risk of fire and improve 
indoor air quality (Wesselink & Moosa, 2011). The listed social benefits of 
Reliance Compost include job creation, staff training, donations made to 
external community projects and establishing Oranjezicht City Farm which 
celebrates local food, culture and community (Hetherington & Palmer, 2013). 
Reliance Compost states that its carbon revenue is earmarked for staff and 
community benefits. However, as Reliance Compost operates at a profit without 
the sale of credits, there is a concern that carbon revenue may simply replace 
funds that the firm would have allocated to social spending anyway (Cartwright, 
22 June 2013: personal communication). Overall, it appears that projects 
registered with Credible Carbon deliver tangible and significant social benefits.  
 
 
d. Price determination in the Credible Carbon model  
 
The price that carbon is able to secure in the voluntary market is important for 
the viability of the market. In particular smaller scale projects require a higher 
carbon price in order to pay off the auditor’s fee. It is therefore important to 
identify which factors influence the price of offsets.  
 
Four key factors can be identified:  
 
 Size of the sale  
 Buyer’s intentions  
 Attractiveness of the project  
 Carbon standards and quality of verification 
 
Credible Carbon’s current average price per ton of CO2 is R90. Online purchases 
are subject to a set price of R120 per ton. This is a premium price for small 
transactions. Larger purchases by institutional buyers are typically negotiated 
less formally by a company representative and the registry. The registry is 
usually willing to lower its prices if the buyer offers to purchase a large volume 
of credits. If the buyer’s intentions are to buy credits for public relations reasons, 
the attractiveness of a project in terms of its social benefits weighs heavily on 
the price. Institutional buyers are willing to pay a higher price for credits from 
more ‘attractive’ projects, such as the Hout Bay Recycling Co-op than for 
credits from more industrial projects, such as Reliance Compost (Cartwright, 22 
June 2013: personal communication). The nature of carbon offsets requires 
rigorous carbon standards and verification to reassure buyers that reductions are 
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real. Hence projects with more convincing documentation and reputable auditing 
can command higher prices in the market (Peters-Stanley & Hamilton, 2012).  
 
 
e. Will Credible Carbon cope with a statutory offset 
system?  
 
The case study reveals that Credible Carbon’s model of voluntary carbon trading 
is functioning well. Lower transaction costs mean that smaller projects with high 
social benefits can earn revenue from the sale of VERs. Voluntary buyers are 
typically interested in buying offsets for PR reasons thus community focused 
projects can receive a good price for their offsets. Independent carbon auditors, 
overseen by PACE, ensure that projects do not overstate their reductions. Both 
the auditors and the registry have an incentive to ensure that reductions are 
measured accurately in order to maintain a good reputation. Currently, Credible 
Carbon does not operate for profit and employees are paid at a rate far lower 
than market rates. The market is too small for the system to make a significant 
environmental impact. However, the registry is achieving its goal of using 
carbon trading as a means to direct revenue to ‘good’ projects that have a 
discernible impact on poverty.  
 
While Credible Carbon currently functions in the voluntary market, it provides a 
‘rough and ready’ system that could be moved into the compliance space with a 
statutory offset system. The advantage of the Treasury recognising offsets from 
local registries, such as Credible Carbon, is that it keeps revenue in South 
Africa. Firstly, the offset projects are located in South Africa and secondly, 
whereas both the Department of Energy and international registries make use of 
international carbon auditors, Credible Carbon hires auditors based in South 
Africa. Moreover, Credible Carbon supports projects that aim to deliver both 
socioeconomic benefits and GHG reductions. This is in agreement with 
government’s overarching view that climate change policies should also 
promote development.  
 
At an average price of R90 per ton of CO2e Credible Carbon’s offsets would be 
competitive with the tax of R120 per ton. If the Treasury were to allow firms to 
purchase offsets from Credible Carbon, the registry would likely face a dramatic 
increase in demand. A concern is whether or not the system can be scaled up to 
meet this demand. With increased demand certain projects could produce more 
VERs. For example, Umdoni Biofuel would be able to expand the scheme to 
include more households or provide more fuel to each household. Successful 
projects such as the Hout Bay Recycling Co-op could be replicated in other 
communities. Verification methods could be tailored to a certain type of project 
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and the established methodology simply repeated for the different project 
locations. Thus, in the long run costs are expected to fall as projects are 
expanded or replicated and technical skills are gained.  
 
Another issue to consider is how a change in buyers’ intentions might affect the 
system. In the voluntary market buyers are willing to pay for credits with a 
‘good story’ but in the compliance market buyers generally want to purchase 
legitimate offsets at the lowest cost. Often projects which deliver offsets at a low 
cost are large and industrial with less social benefits (Corbera et al., 2009). Less 
pressure from the demand side to establish projects with high social benefits 
should not be a problem if the registry remains committed to selling offsets from 
projects that make a discernible impact on poverty. However, a potential role for 
government could be to provide additional oversight to ensure that projects are 
indeed benefitting local communities under the statutory offset system.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
An offset mechanism has the potential to increase economic efficiency and 
reduce the effect of the planned carbon tax on industry competitiveness. Using 
Credible Carbon as a case study, this paper argues that local, community 
focused registries are desirable and scalable, and should be recognised by the 
National Treasury as the appropriate delivery vehicle for the proposed 
mechanism. Increased demand for offsets from the new carbon tax policy has 
the potential to lower transaction costs in the long run, promote higher levels of 
technical expertise, and increase the environmental and socioeconomic impact 
of the system by enabling the establishment of more offset projects. However 
there remain a few concerns regarding the implementation of an offset 
mechanism that policymakers need to pay careful attention to.   
 
The legitimacy of offsetting as a means to combat climate change is dependent 
on whether or not offset projects actually deliver their stated carbon reductions 
and whether these reductions are additional to a business-as-usual scenario. 
Independent and accredited carbon auditors are thus crucial to the proper 
functioning of the system. There is a concern that auditors could be biased 
towards approving projects if it brings them more work in the future and that 
auditors in South Africa may simply not have the technical knowledge and skills 
required to accurately calculate emissions reductions. Further questions that 
need to be asked are: Which bodies in South Africa are capable of measuring 
carbon reductions? How expert and unbiased are the auditors? Should 
government invest in training more carbon auditors? Should government be 
responsible for establishing a set of uniform standards and methodologies that 
auditors can apply?  
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A further difficulty is measuring the social impacts of offset projects. Concepts 
such as ‘sustainable development’ and ‘community benefits’ are subjective and 
mean different things to different people and governments. Currently, carbon 
auditors qualitatively list and assess the social benefits of offset projects 
registered with Credible Carbon. However, a more rigorous set of standards may 
be required if the scheme is to be implemented on a larger scale. A number of 
methods exist for quantifying social impacts. Household income is one of the 
most widely used measures of economic progress. However, human well-being 
is multi-dimensional and includes health, education, social connections and 
political freedoms. An alternative perspective is Sen’s capabilities approach 
which focuses on means that increase an individual’s capability to do or be 
something different, of which money is just one tool (Stiglitz et al., 2009). The 
measurement of social benefits will also need to account for the distinction 
between current well-being and sustainability, that is, whether benefits will last 
over time.  
 
An issue touched on earlier in this paper is that carbon offsetting may allow 
firms to lower their tax liability without undertaking any serious commitment to 
reduce the carbon intensity of their production methods or invest in clean 
technology. In order to promote a transition to a low-carbon economy, long-term 
changes to move away from fossil fuels are required. If offset projects result in 
real carbon reductions and are long-term in nature, offsetting should not be 
restricted (Stern, 2007). Hence, government and carbon registries should be alert 
to promoting projects that are sustainable in order to shift the economy away 
from a dependency on non-renewable energy forms. A final concern is whether 
or not the demand for offsets will be as robust as anticipated. Initially, firms may 
be able to reduce emissions quite easily and cheaply in-house. However, it is 
expected that as low cost abatement options are exhausted and as the tax rate is 
gradually increased and tax-free thresholds lowered, offsetting will become 
increasingly attractive to firms.   
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